Trial by Jury: An Ancient Right on Trial

When Athenian citizens first gathered under the legal reforms of Solon, in the sixth century BC, to hear evidence and deliver verdicts, they forged a principle that would echo through the centuries: trial by jury. Centuries later, this tradition of judgement by peers became embedded in English law. In 1215, Magna Carta’s Clause 39 declared: “No free man shall be seized or imprisoned… except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land.” This principle became a cornerstone of English justice and was emulated throughout the democratic world.

Yet today, this ancient institution is under renewed strain and risk. The UK government is reviewing proposals led by Sir Brian Leveson (2024–2025) to limit the right to trial by jury in certain cases. The purpose is to primarily tackle the record Crown Court backlog, now standing at over 73,000 cases, which has left victims and defendants waiting years for resolution. Leveson has warned that reform is “essential” to prevent the criminal justice system from reaching breaking point and that, as ever, “justice delayed is justice denied.”

The Leveson proposals envisage a new division of the Crown Court, consisting of a judge and two magistrates, that handles less serious offences alongside increased use of out-of-court resolutions and judge-only trials. In effect, jury trials could become the exception rather than rule. Supporters argue this would speed up proceedings, cut costs, and reduce stress for victims by avoiding lengthy delays.

The potential advantages are obvious. Jury trials are time-consuming, expensive, and unpredictable. Judge-only hearings could be faster, cheaper, and more consistent. Incentivising early guilty pleas (with increased sentence reductions of up to ~40%) could further ease the pressure on courts and prisons alike.

Nevertheless, the cost of this reform could be profound. The jury is not merely a procedural tool: it is a symbol of democratic participation in justice. Juries allow the conscience and common sense of ordinary citizens to temper the letter of the law and act as a check on state power and professional elites. Restricting their use risks eroding public confidence, reducing transparency, and concentrating judicial authority in fewer hands.

Legal professional bodies have voiced strong opposition. Barbara Mills KC, Chair of the Bar Council, argues that: “Changing the fundamental structure of delivering criminal justice is not a principled response to a crisis that was not caused by that structure in the first place. As Sir Brian recognises, it is the failure to invest properly in the justice system over decades that has led to the crisis we see in the criminal courts today.”

Richard Atkinson, President of the Law Society, has also warned that: “The proposed new division of the Crown Court on its own will not solve the backlog. The government risks undermining our historic jury system for no effect.”

Critics contend that shifting cases away from juries would merely relocate the backlog rather than resolve it, and that long-term under-investment in courts and staff remains the true cause of delay. Others fear that judge-only trials could disadvantage defendants from minority backgrounds, since juries are generally more representative of society than the bench.

The Leveson Review (Part 1) has now been published, and the Government has committed to considering its recommendations. The next phase will be decisive, but its direction remains uncertain. What is even more uncertain is the reaction of the public, for more than eight centuries, through the practice of juries, public citizens have judged their peers and participated in the delivery of justice in the land. If that right is removed or curtailed, public faith in the justice system could be fundamentally undermined.

As philosopher A. C. Grayling once wrote, the jury stands as the “palladium of liberty against arbitrary authority.” If the jury becomes a historical relic rather than a fundamental right, how will society know, trust, and feel that justice is being done?

As parliament considers these proposals the question for the government is not just are thesereforms necessary, but can they be implemented without dismantling our legal systems legitimacy. Eight centuries after Magna Carta, the principle of judgment by one’s peers faces its greatest test. Will the government choose expediency over principle or can it navigate a path to achieve both?