Trial by Jury: Revised

When Athenian citizens gathered under Solon’s legal reforms in the sixth century BC to hear evidence and deliver verdicts, they forged a principle that would echo through the centuries: trial by jury. Centuries later, this tradition of judgement by peers became embedded in English law. Magna Carta 1215, cl 39 declared: “No free man shall be seized or imprisoned… except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land.” It became a cornerstone of English justice and was later emulated across the democratic world.

Today, that institution faces one of its most significant tests in generations.

The UK government is reviewing proposals led by Sir Brian Leveson (2024–2025) to limit the right to trial by jury in certain cases. Leveson has warned that reform is “essential” to prevent the criminal justice system from reaching breaking point. The objective is clear: to reduce the record Crown Court backlog, now exceeding 80,000 cases, which has left victims and defendants waiting years for resolution. Advocates of legal reform argue that structural change is essential to prevent the system from reaching breaking point.

The Leveson proposals envisaged a new division of the Crown Court, consisting of a judge and two magistrates, that handles less serious offences alongside increased use of out-of-court resolutions and judge-only trials. In effect, jury trials risk becoming the exception rather than the rule. Supporters argue this would speed up proceedings, cut costs, and reduce stress for victims by avoiding lengthy delays.

Supporters contend that jury trials are time-consuming, expensive, and unpredictable. Judge-only hearings could be faster, cheaper, and more consistent. Incentivising early guilty pleas, with offers of sentence reductions, could further ease the pressure on courts and prisons alike. In a system under strain, the appeal of efficiency – to ministers, to victims, and to the wider stretched judiciary – is undeniable.

Despite widespread opposition, David Lammy (Justice Secretary) has defended the legislation, stating in parliament: “When victims are left waiting for years, justice is effectively denied to them” (HC Deb 2 December 2025, vol 776, col 801). PM Starmer has publicly backed the Justice Secretary, describing the reforms as necessary and a “fundamental argument of principle” (The Guardian 28 January 2026) and insisting he will not U-turn on the plan to scrap some jury trials.

Legal professional bodies have voiced strong opposition. Barbara Mills KC, Chair of the Bar Council, argues that “the criminal justice system is not in crisis because of jury trials” and that “removing jury trials has not been piloted or modelled with any evidence it will significantly reduce the backlog.” Richard Atkinson, President of the Law Society, has also warned that: “The proposed new division of the Crown Court on its own will not solve the backlog. The government risks undermining our historic jury system for no effect.”

There is a consistent thread across the profession’s response: the backlog has been caused by chronic underfunding, not by the existence of jury trials. The proposed cure does not match the diagnosis of the problem.

In an extraordinary joint statement, the Four Bars – representing the professions of England and Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Ireland – have weighed in on what are, in essence, English legislative proposals, declaring: “We are deeply concerned that the UK government is planning to restrict the right to a jury trial in England and Wales. Being tried by a jury of one’s peers is a fundamental cornerstone of the criminal justice system in our respective jurisdictions.”

Yet it was only in February 2026 that Lammy finally removed the cap on Crown Court sitting days – arguably the most obvious first step to reducing the current backlog, and one that should surely have preceded any discussion of restricting jury trials.

The political dimension is significant. Politicians have pointed out that both Lammy and Starmer have previously been robust in their defence of jury trials. Lammy tweeted that “criminal trials without juries are a bad idea” and that “you don’t fix the backlog with trials that are widely perceived as unfair” (as quoted in HC Deb 2 December 2025, vol 776, col 803). Starmer has previously stated that, as far back as 1992, “there should be a right of trial by jury in all criminal cases” (Haldane Society of Socialist Lawyers 1992).

Support appears limited outside of government, with opposition being remarkably broad, spanning the criminal bar, solicitors, all four UK bars, Labour backbenchers, and the Conservatives alike. Labour MP Karl Turner, himself a trained lawyer, has been orchestrating a Labour rebellion, saying he was ashamed of both the PM and Lammy and describing the policy as ludicrous. He threatened to resign his seat and force a by-election over the issue, and around 60 Labour MPs signed a letter calling for the plans to be reconsidered.

But the voiced opposition to these legislative proposals is only part of the government’s problems. The jury trial reforms will require primary legislation, and the Lords presents a significant obstacle. The difficulty is that jury trial reform was not a specific manifesto commitment. Labour’s 2024 manifesto spoke generally about tackling the courts backlog but did not promise to restrict jury trials. This matters enormously because of the Salisbury-Addison Convention. The convention ensures that major government bills can pass through the Lords when the government has no majority there, but it applies specifically to legislation foreshadowed in a governing party’s manifesto. Opponents can therefore argue there is no electoral mandate for this specific reform.

Beyond the practical and political objections, the principled cost of these reforms is profound. The jury is not merely a procedural tool; it is a symbol of democratic participation in justice. Juries allow the conscience and common sense of ordinary citizens to temper the letter of the law and act as a check on state power and professional elites. Restricting their use erodes public confidence, reduces transparency, and concentrates judicial authority in fewer hands.

A YouGov poll (November 2025) showed that 54% of the public would prefer a jury to decide their verdict if accused of a crime, but the true reaction of society, if such changes are enacted, is unknown. For more than eight centuries, through the practice of juries, citizens have judged their peers and participated in the delivery of justice in the land. If that right is removed or curtailed, public faith in the justice system could be fundamentally undermined. If the jury becomes the exception rather than the norm, how will society know, trust, and feel that justice is being done?

Clearly the backlog is unconscionable. Victims waiting years for justice is indefensible and doing nothing is not a real option. But restricting jury trials, and thereby curtailing a long-established constitutional safeguard central to democratic participation in justice, is not the answer.

Efficiency should never come at the cost of justice itself.